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Background: Out-of-pocket payments for health services constitute a major financial burden for patients in
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Individuals who are unable to pay use different coping strategies
(e.g. borrowing money or foregoing service utilization), which can have negative consequences on their health
and social welfare. This article explores patients’ inability to pay for outpatient and hospital services in six CEE
countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Ukraine. Methods: The analysis is based on quan-
titative data collected in 2010 in nationally representative surveys. Two indicators of inability to pay were
considered: the need to borrow money or sell assets and foregoing service utilization. Statistical analyses were
applied to investigate associations between the indicators of inability to pay and individual characteristics. Results:
Patient payments are most common in Bulgaria, Ukraine, Romania and Lithuania and often include informal
payments. Romanian and, particularly, Ukrainian patients most often face difficulties to pay for health services
(with approximately 40% of Ukrainian payers borrowing money or selling assets to cover hospital payments
and approximately 60% of respondents who need care foregoing services). Inability to pay mainly affects those
with poor health and low incomes. Conclusion: Widespread patient payments constitute a major financial barrier
to health service use in CEE. There is a need to formalize them where they are informal and to take measures to
protect vulnerable population groups, especially those with limited possibilities to deal with payment difficulties.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Introduction
The transition period in Central and Eastern European (CEE)countries has brought significant changes to their health
systems, including health care financing.1,2 The severe economic
downturn in the 1990s, coupled in many countries with rising un-
employment, inflation, low salaries, tax evasion and a large informal
sector, led to specific challenges, such as substantial deficits in the
public financing of health systems. Countries struggled to retain the
coverage levels of the communist period, which had given universal
access to a broad range of (admittedly, poor-quality) health
services.3,4 Many opted to ration publicly funded health services,
such as through limiting the scope of basic benefit packages or
introducing patient cost-sharing. However, not all planned reforms
were implemented, and some were reversed, largely due to a lack of
political and social consensus.5–7 Furthermore, implicit rationing had
already become a common feature of CEE health systems. This
included informal (under-the-table) patient payments, quasi-formal
payments (introduced by health care providers to compensate for
insufficient funding) and long waiting lists, which compelled
patients to seek health care in the private sector.5,8–10
As a result, patients in CEE countries are now confronted
with various payment obligations when using health services, and
out-of-pocket payments constitute a major source of health care
financing, accounting, in 2010, for 37.8% of total health expenditure
in Latvia, 40.5% in Ukraine and 44.2% in Bulgaria.11 This imposes a
particular financial burden on vulnerable groups in the population,
such as those with low incomes or chronic conditions.12–14 Patients
who are unable to pay use different coping strategies, either to meet
health care costs (e.g. by limiting other expenses, borrowing money
or selling assets) or to avoid payments (e.g. by foregoing or delaying
health care utilization).15–18 Both types of strategy are likely to
have negative consequences for health and social welfare at the
individual and population level. Although this issue has major
policy implications, empirical evidence on the inability to pay in
CEE countries is sparse. This is surprising, as it is likely that this
problem will grow in the future. The current economic crisis has
already led to an increase in the level of unemployment throughout
the CEE region and in some countries, deepened poverty and social
inequality, while high public budget deficits led some governments
to increase their reliance on private sources of health care
financing.19–21
This article explores the inability to pay for health services in six
CEE countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and
Ukraine. We focus on two key indicators of inability to pay: the need
to borrow money and/or sell assets (representing strategies aimed
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at meeting health care costs) and foregoing health service utilization
(a strategy to avoid costs). The analysis is based on quantitative data
collected in 2010 in nationally representative surveys in the six
countries mentioned earlier. The countries present a suitable base
for comparison, as they share a similar communist health system
legacy, as well as broadly similar health reform objectives. At the
same time, our analysis takes account of the diversity across the six
countries, including their socio-economic development, integration
into supranational structures (with Ukraine left outside the enlarged
EU) and differences in the financing and organization of health
systems.
Methods
The data analysed in this article were collected in surveys among
nationally representative samples of the adult population in each
of the six CEE countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania and Ukraine). The main objective of the surveys was to
collect quantitative data on the individual willingness and ability to
pay for health services. To ensure comparability of data across
countries, the questionnaire was identical for all six countries. It
was developed in English and then translated into national
languages (back translations were undertaken by independent trans-
lators to verify the quality of the translations). The data collection
process took place simultaneously in all six countries in a period of
20 calendar days in July–August 2010. The surveys were conducted
using face-to-face interviews. The samples were selected using a
multi-stage random probability design, which included: (i) distribu-
tion of sampling points, (ii) selection of households based on the
random route method and (iii) selection of the adult respondent
within the household based on the last birthday principle. The data
collection resulted in approximately 1000 effective interviews per
country. The response rates were 38% in Poland, 42% in Ukraine,
55% in Romania and Lithuania, 67% in Bulgaria and 76% in
Hungary. The samples are fairly representative for the countries
(Supplementary Appendix 1). The survey questions of interest in
this article refer to the inability to pay for health services by indi-
viduals (Supplementary Appendix 2).
We applied statistical analyses to investigate associations between
indicators of inability to pay and individual characteristics, using the
software package Stata 11. To analyse the first indicator of inability
to pay (the need to borrow money and/or sell assets), a sequential
logit model is used.22 It allows us to examine the relation between
respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics and the need of
borrowing/selling assets, while accounting for the use of health
services and paying for services. The association between the
second indicator of inability to pay (foregoing health services) and
respondents’ characteristics is studied by means of multinomial
logistic regression. Differences are analysed for four groups of re-
spondents: users who did not forego services due to payments
(reference category), users who forewent services due to payments,
non-users who forewent services due to payments and non-users
who did not forego services due to payments.
The explanatory variables in both analyses are age, gender,
place of residence, education, equivalized household income
(using the modified Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) equivalence scale23), health insurance status,
self-perceived health status and presence of a diagnosed chronic
illness. Due to the high number of missing data on income
(average for all countries: 7.75%), the missing values were
replaced using data on the perception of income, obtained in the
same survey (Supplementary Appendix 3). A dummy variable
(income proxy: 1 = proxied income, 0 = reported income) was
included in the model to indicate the replaced missing values.
Variables used in the models are described in Supplementary
Appendix 3. The analyses are done separately for each country, as
well as jointly for all countries. Because the analyses per country
showed similar patterns, this article presents only the results for the
aggregated sample of six countries. The models include country
indicators, except for Lithuania, which is taken as the reference
country, as our initial analysis found that this country usually
ranked in the middle in cross-country comparisons.
Results
Tables 1 and 2 present the descriptive statistics related to out-of-pocket
payments for health services and the two coping strategies in response
to inability to pay (i.e. borrowing money or selling assets, and foregoing
utilization). The statistics show that out-of-pocket payments for health
services are common in Bulgaria (reported by >70% of outpatient
service users and approximately 60% of hospital care users).
However, most of these payments are formal and comparatively
small. Patients also very often pay for health services in Ukraine,
Romania and Lithuania (with up to 70% of users paying for hospital
services in Ukraine). In contrast to Bulgaria, payments in these
countries are often also informal and relatively high. The percentage
of users who report paying for health services is lowest in Poland (where
approximately 80% of users did not pay for services at all) and
Hungary. Yet, in Hungary, payments for hospitalizations are reported
by 46% of users, and the vast majority of payments are informal.
Overall, payments related to hospitalizations are more common
and more often include informal payments than payments for
outpatient care. The median amount of money paid in a year is
also higher for hospital services than for outpatient services. Thus,
the burden of hospital payments for individuals is substantial. The
highest median share of these payments in annual equivalized
household income was reported in Ukraine (7.8%) and Romania
(4.7%). For 43.5 and 23.9% of payers in these two countries, re-
spectively, these payments accounted for at least 10% of household
income per equivalent adult.
The differences in out-of-pocket payments for outpatient and
inpatient services have implications for the coping strategies to
deal with the inability to pay. The strategy of borrowing money or
selling assets to cover payments is reported more frequently for
inpatient than for outpatient services. The median amount of
money borrowed is also higher for inpatient than for outpatient
services, which seems to be related to the higher payments for
inpatient care. The money borrowed is often equal to the entire
payment, with the median amount of money borrowed as a
percentage of total payment being 70%. Ukrainian and Romanian
patients most often report borrowing money or selling assets,
whereas in Hungary, this strategy is least commonly reported.
In contrast, the second strategy (i.e. foregoing health service util-
ization) is more often applied for outpatient care than for hospital
services. Not visiting a physician at least once or not being
hospitalized due to inability to pay is most commonly reported in
Ukraine (by approximately 60% of those in need). In all countries,
the median number of foregone services in a year is two for
outpatient visits and one for hospitalizations. The average number
of foregone services is highest in Romania (3.3 visits to physicians
and 1.8 hospitalizations) and lowest in Poland and Hungary.
The results of the sequential logit model (table 3) indicate that
paying for health care services is more common not only among
younger respondents, women (for outpatient services only), those
living in rural areas and individuals with higher income, but also
among those with worse health status or a chronic condition. The
results also confirm that paying for services is significantly more
prevalent in Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine, whereas respondents
in Hungary and Poland less often pay for health services, compared
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with Lithuania. After controlling for the use of health care services
and for paying for services, the probability of borrowing money or
selling assets increases with a lower health status and a lower income.
For individuals with a poor health status, the odds of borrowing
money/selling assets to pay for outpatient services and hospital
services are, respectively, 5.2 and 3.8 times higher than the odds
for individuals in good health. Also, the presence of a chronic
illness is significantly associated with this coping strategy (for
outpatient services). On the other hand, for a one unit increase
in log-transformed income (a 2.72-fold increase), we see an
approximately 50% decrease in the odds of borrowing money/
selling assets for both types of services. We also observe that
borrowing/selling assets is more likely among younger respondents
and among those with a university education (for hospital services,
P 0.1). Furthermore, this coping strategy is significantly more
often applied in Romania, but less often in Bulgaria and Hungary,
compared with Lithuania.
The association of the second type of coping strategy (i.e.
foregoing services) with the selected characteristics of respondents
was studied by means of a multinomial logistic regression (table 4).
Table 1 Out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for outpatient and inpatient services—descriptive statistics
Indicators Bulgaria Hungary Lithuania Poland Romania Ukraine Total
Number of respondents 1003 1037 1012 1000 1000 1000 6052
Number and percentage of respondents
who use services
P 736 (73.4) 826 (79.7) 739 (73.0) 735 (73.5) 651 (65.1) 572 (57.2) 4259 (70.4)
H 171 (17.0) 219 (21.1) 165 (16.3) 159 (15.9) 192 (19.2) 184 (18.4) 1090 (18.0)
Number and percentage of users who pay for servicesa
Formal and/or informal payments P 540 (72.4) 223 (26.9) 316 (42.7) 171 (23.2) 341 (52.2) 322 (56.1) 1913 (44.5)
H 105 (61.0) 101 (45.9) 99 (59.6) 34 (21.4) 112 (58.0) 130 (70.7) 581 (53.1)
Formal payments P 512 (67.0) 105 (12.7) 233 (31.5) 142 (19.3) 275 (42.1) 240 (41.8) 1507 (35.1)
H 97 (56.4) 23 (10.5) 50 (30.1) 13 (8.2) 81 (42.0) 99 (53.8) 363 (33.2)
Informal payments P 71 (9.5) 174 (21.0) 146 (19.7) 49 (6.7) 187 (28.6) 208 (36.2) 835 (19.4)
H 34 (19.8) 97 (44.1) 82 (49.4) 26 (16.4) 95 (49.2) 89 (48.4) 423 (38.7)
Amount paid per year (E): median value in payers’ sample
Formal and/or informal payments P 6.0 35.1 28.6 48.8 46.5 20.6 24.4
H 25.0 87.7 85.7 48.8 93.0 103.1 73.2
Formal payments P 5.5 35.1 28.6 48.4 34.9 20.6 17.5
H 24.0 35.1 57.1 48.8 58.1 103.1 48.8
Informal payments P 15.0 35.1 28.6 24.3 23.3 10.3 23.3
H 10.0 105.3 85.7 48.8 46.5 41.2 57.1
Total amount paid as % of equivalized
annual incomeb: median in payers’
sample
P 0.3% 0.9% 0.9% 1.1% 1.8% 1.7% 0.9%
H 1.4% 2.3% 2.2% 1.0% 4.7% 7.8% 3.1%
Percentage of payers with a total
amount paid 10% of equivalized
annual income
P 3.0% 2.3% 6.2% 3.2% 13.2% 11.4% 6.7%
H 13.4% 8.2% 16.2% 3.1% 23.9% 43.5% 21.1%
P: outpatient physician services; H: inpatient hospital services.
a: Missing values of payments (number and percentage of users): Bulgaria: P = 51 (6.7%), H = 14 (8.1%); Hungary: P = 13 (1.6%), H = 4 (1.8%);
Lithuania: P = 10 (1.4%), H = 1 (0.6%); Poland: P = 13 (1.8%), H = 3 (1.9%); Romania: P = 42 (6.4%), H = 19 (9.8%); Ukraine: P = 6 (1.0%),
H = 6 (3.3%).
b: Household income was equalized using the OECD-modified scale, which assigns the weight 1 to the first adult, 0.5 to each additional
adult and 0.3 to each child aged <14 years (in our study, a person aged <18).
Table 2 Indicators of inability to pay—descriptive statistics
Indicators Bulgaria Hungary Lithuania Poland Romania Ukraine Total
Borrowing money/selling assets
Number and percentage of payers who
borrow/sell
P 33 (5.6) 13 (5.5) 35 (10.7) 24 (13.0) 83 (21.7) 60 (18.3) 248 (12.1)
H 22 (18.5) 12 (11.4) 23 (23.0) 9 (24.3) 45 (34.4) 58 (42.6) 169 (26.9)
Amount borrowed per year (E): median value
in borrowers’ sample
P 50.0 17.5 57.1 109.8 69.8 51.5 57.1
H 140.0 87.7 142.9 122.0 93.0 128.9 116.3
Amount borrowed as % of amount paid:
median in borrowers’ sample
P 93.2% 50.0% 100.0% 63.3% 62.5% 50.0% 66.7%
H 100.0% 63.3% 66.7% 71.4% 75.0% 66.7% 70.7%
Amount borrowed as % of equivalized
incomea: median in borrowers’ sample
P 2.8% 0.6% 2.6% 2.5% 3.3% 3.8% 3.1%
H 8.5% 2.7% 4.3% 3.7% 4.7% 10.3% 6.3%
Foregoing services
Number and percentage of users (actual and
potential)b who forewent services
P 307 (40.4) 257 (29.7) 214 (28.0) 215 (28.5) 284 (42.0) 465 (64.6) 1742 (38.4)
H 60 (29.1) 27 (11.6) 32 (17.8) 23 (13.2) 94 (39.5) 165 (60.4) 401 (30.8)
Number of foregone services per year: mean
and standard deviation in sample of
those who forewentc
P 2.7 (2.2) 2.5 (2.0) 2.3 (2.1) 2.5 (2.0) 3.3 (4.8) 2.7 (2.2) 2.7 (2.8)
H 1.6 (1.3) 1.3 (0.8) 1.4 (0.9) 1.3 (0.7) 1.8 (1.3) 2.0 (1.6) 1.7 (1.4)
P: outpatient physician services; H: inpatient hospital services.
a: Household income was equalized using the OECD-modified scale, which assigns the weight 1 to the first adult, 0.5 to each additional
adult and 0.3 to each child aged <14 (in our study, a person aged <18).
b: The sample users (actual and potential) included (1) respondents who used health care services in the past 12 months and did not forego
any services, and (2) respondents who did not use services but forewent services due to inability to pay.
c: In all countries, the median number of foregone services equals 2 for outpatient physician services and 1 for hospitalization.
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Users and non-users who forewent services due to the inability to
pay were compared with users who did not face this problem. A
higher income resulted in a lower probability of foregoing services,
irrespective of the group (users and non-users). In addition, users
were more likely to forego inpatient and outpatient services if their
health status was poor. For individuals with poor health relative to
individuals with good health, the relative risk ratio of foregoing
services is 1.7 and 3.1 for outpatient care and hospital care, respect-
ively. Foregoing outpatient care is also significantly more likely
among women and young people. Compared with Lithuania,
foregoing outpatient and hospital care is significantly more
common in Ukraine and Romania.
Discussion
In this article, we have analysed patients’ inability to pay for health
services in six CEE countries. The analysis is limited to out-of pocket
payments for health services incurred by individuals, not considering
other direct costs of illness (e.g. for pharmaceuticals) and indirect
costs (e.g. loss of income due to illness) for individuals, and
also other household members. This is a potential limitation of
our study, as we do not capture the total burden of illness for
households. We might also miss some interrelations, as the
inability to pay for services can, for example, be a result of high
costs for pharmaceuticals. Another drawback of our study is that
we investigated only two types of behaviour (i.e. borrowing money/
selling assets and foregoing health service utilization), whereas
households might also use other strategies to deal with payment
difficulties, such as cutting other expenses or using savings.
However, in our analysis, we did not aim to depict the full
spectrum of coping behaviours, but only examine the two main
types of strategies (i.e. strategies aimed at meeting the costs and
strategies aimed at avoiding the costs), which have, in various
studies, been found to be the most commonly used.15–18,24
Our study provides important insights into the prevalence of
patient payments for health services in CEE countries and the
burden that these payments constitute. The results confirm that
paying for health services is common, but also that there are
major differences across countries. Reasons for the different
patterns and frequency of payments are likely to include the level
of public resources devoted to health, as well as differences in
attitudes and health system governance.
In Poland and Hungary, countries with a relatively high public
health spending per capita,11 patient payments occur least
frequently. In both countries, the use of publicly financed health
services does generally not require formal patient co-payments.25,26
Instead, payments occur in the private sector (due to poor access to
publicly financed care, mostly in the outpatient sector), or are
requested by public health care providers (quasi-formal payments,
mostly for hospital care).27 The latter practice, which is of question-
able legality, is being restricted in Poland. There are also some in-
dications that the spread of informal payments in Poland was
reduced as a result of anticorruption measures undertaken in the
past years.28,29 This might explain why Polish respondents relatively
rarely reported paying for services. In contrast, in Hungary, there
was a high frequency of informal payments (especially for hospital
services), which might be due to a more positive attitude towards
these payments among health care consumers and policymakers
than in some other countries of the region.30
In the other countries, i.e. Ukraine, Romania, Lithuania and
Bulgaria, paying for health services is common. Among them,
Bulgaria is the only country with a universal system of formal co-
payments for publicly financed health services.31 This could explain
why Bulgarian consumers most often reported small formal
payments. In Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine, informal as well as
quasi-formal payments (frequently requested by providers to
compensate for insufficient public funding) are widespread, often
imposing a double financial burden on patients.32,33 These payments
are largely outside the control of governments and thus not
supported by measures to secure equity. The high frequency of
these payments, combined with relatively high poverty rates,
especially in Ukraine and Romania,34,35 has catastrophic conse-
quences for patients and their households. Our results indicate
that Ukrainian and Romanian patients face the greatest burden of
payments and difficulties in paying for health services. As mentioned
earlier, the financial burden could be even greater, if other costs of
illness were considered, such as the costs for pharmaceuticals, which
are particularly high in CEE countries.11 Policies to reduce out-of-
pocket payments, particularly in countries such as Romania and
Ukraine, seem to be urgently needed.
Based on the results of our analysis, it can be concluded that
patient payments are determined by health care needs on one
hand (i.e. poor self-perceived health status, chronic condition),
and the ability to pay (i.e. higher income) for better quality and
access to services on the other hand. As indicated by our results,
individuals who have greater needs but a low ability to pay for
services (i.e. those with low income) often forego using health
services and more often borrow money and sell assets to cover
payments, compared with healthier and wealthier groups.
The choice of a strategy in response to payment difficulties might
be affected by the ability of households to mobilize financial
resources (resource portfolio), as well as the type of health
problems and related costs.16–18 Individuals with more resources
(material, human and social) have also greater ability to borrow
money or sell assets.15,16,24,36 In our study, we observe that
younger respondents and those with a university education are
more likely to apply this strategy. Households might also try to
mobilize resources if the health problem is severe or care is not
initiated by the patient.16,17 Thus, we observe that foregoing care
is less common for hospital than for outpatient care, whereas the
opposite is true for the strategy of borrowing money/selling assets.
Strategies in response to cost pressure may have adverse conse-
quences for individuals, households and society as a whole. Not
seeking health care when needed, as commonly reported by the re-
spondents in our study, might worsen one’s health status, ultimately
increasing the cost of illness, and might lead to a deterioration of
one’s health, economic and social status. Borrowing money, if it
leads to accumulated debt, might bring similar negative results in
the long run.16,17 Policies are required to protect the most vulnerable
population groups and to ensure more equitable access to health
services. Replacing informal or quasi-formal payments with a
universal system of formal charges might help to protect individuals
with low income or poor health, by exempting them from payments
or applying fees limits. However, the potential of such policies to
enhance equity is limited. First, it is challenging to develop and
apply exemption mechanisms that effectively target vulnerable
population groups.37,38 Second, formal fees rarely substitute for
informal payments, unless the reasons for their presence are
eliminated.10,39,40 Therefore, public investments in CEE health
systems to enhance the quality and accessibility of health services,
as well as improved system governance, are crucial to improve equity
of health financing and utilization in this part of Europe.
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Key points
 In the most poorly financed CEE health systems, patients are
often confronted with payment obligations for health
services. Many of these obligations are not state-regulated
(as they are informal or quasi-formal) and represent a sig-
nificant financial burden for households.
 Out-of-pocket payments for health care in CEE countries are
determined by individuals’ health needs and ability to pay.
Those who have greater needs but low income often forego
health care or have to borrow money and sell assets to pay
for services.
 The choice of coping strategies in response to payment
difficulties depends on the ability of individuals to mobilize
resources and the type of health services; borrowing money or
selling assets is more common for hospital services, whereas
foregoing utilization is more often applied in the case of
inability to pay for outpatient services.
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4 Golinowska S, Sowa A, Topór-Madry R. Health Status and Health Care Systems in
Central and Eastern Europe Countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and
Hungary. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2006.
5 Gotsadze G, Gaál P. Coverage decisions: benefit entitlements and patient cost
sharing. In: Kutzin J, Cashin C, Jakab M, editors. Implementing Health Financing
Reform Lessons from Countries in Transition. Copenhagen: World Health
Organization Regional Office for Europe, on behalf of the European Observatory on
Health Systems and Policies, 2010.
6 Teutsch S, Rechel B. Ethics of resource allocation and rationing medical care in a
time of fiscal restraint US and Europe. Public Health Rev 2012: 34.
7 Robinson R. User charges for health care. In: Mossialos E, Dixon A, Figueras J,
Kutzin J, editors. Funding Health Care: Options for Europe. Buckingham: Open
University Press, 2002.
8 Stepurko T, Pavlova M, Gryga I, Groot W. Empirical studies on informal patient
payments for health care services: a systematic and critical review of research
methods and instruments. BMC Health Serv Res 2010;10:273.
9 Lewis M. Informal health payments in Central and Eastern Europe and the former
soviet union: issues, trends, and policy implications. In: Mossialos E, Dixon A,
Figueras J, Kutzin J, editors. Funding Health Care: Options for Europe. Buckingham:
Open University Press, 2002: 184–205.
10 Gaál P, Jakab M, Shishkin S. Strategies to address informal payments for health care.
In: Kutzin J, Cashin C, Jakab M, editors. Implementing Health Financing Reform
Lessons from Countries in Transition. Copenhagen: World Health Organization
Regional Office for Europe, on behalf of the European Observatory on Health
Systems and Policies, 2010: 327–360.
11 WHO. European Health for all Database (offline version), August 2012 edn.
Copenhagen: World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe, 2012.
12 Shakarishvili G. Poverty and Equity in Healthcare Finance: Analyzing Post-Soviet
Healthcare Reform. Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform
Initiative Open Society Institute, 2006.
13 Balabanova D, McKee M, Pomerleau J, et al. Health service utilization in
the former Soviet Union: evidence from eight countries. Health Serv Res 2004;39:
1927–49.
14 Xu K, Evans DB, Kawabata K, et al. Household catastrophic health expenditure: a
multicountry analysis. Lancet 2003;362:111–17.
15 Sauerborn R, Adams A, Hien M. Household strategies to cope with the economic
costs of illness. Soc Sci Med 1996;43:291–301.
16 Russel S. The economic burden of illness for households in developing countries: a
review of studies focusing on malaria, tuberculosis, and human immunodeficiency
virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome. Am J Trop Med Hyg 2004;
71(Suppl. 2):147–55.
17 Chuma J, Gilson L, Molyneux C. Treatment-seeking behaviour, cost burdens and
coping strategies among rural and urban households in Coastal Kenya: an equity
analysis. Trop Med Int Health 2007;12:673–86.
18 McIntyre D, Thiede M, Dahlgren G, Whitehead M. What are the economic
consequences for households of illness and of paying for health care in low- and
middle-income country contexts? Soc Sci Med 2006;62:858–65.
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Blood pressure among rural Montenegrin children
in relation to poverty and gender
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Background: Health inequalities may begin during childhood. The aim of this study was to investigate the main
effect of poverty and its interactive effect with gender on children’s blood pressure. Methods: The study was
performed in two elementary schools from a rural region near Podgorica, the capital of Montenegro. A question-
naire including questions on family monthly income, children’s physical activity and the consumption of junk food
was self-administered by parents of 434 children (223 boys and 211 girls) aged 6–13 years. Children’s poverty level
was assessed using the recommendations from the National Study on Poverty in Montenegro. Children’s body
weight and height were measured and body mass index-for-gender-and-age percentile was calculated. An
oscillometric monitor was used for measurement of children’s resting blood pressure in school. Results: A two-
factorial analysis of variance with body mass index percentile, physical activity and junk food as covariates showed
an interaction of gender and poverty on children’s blood pressure, pointing to synergy between poverty and
female gender, with statistical significance for raised diastolic pressure (F = 5.462; P = 0.021). Neither physical
activity nor the consumption of junk food explained the interactive effect of poverty and gender on blood
pressure. Conclusion: We show that poverty is linked to elevated blood pressure for girls but not boys, and this
effect is statistically significant for diastolic pressure. The results are discussed in the light of gender differences in
stress and coping that are endemic to poverty.
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Introduction
High blood pressure is less frequently found among childrencompared with adults, possibly due to fewer environmental
stressors, higher physical activity levels, lower prevalence of obesity,
healthier lifestyle and infrequent paediatric screening.1 However,
according to prevalence, essential hypertension should be
considered a common chronic disease in children and adolescents.2
We briefly review data on the prevalence of hypertension among
children and adolescents from large studies in different countries.
Hansen et al.3 performed a study on more than 14,000 American
children and adolescents (aged 3–18 years) and determined the
prevalence of hypertension to be 3.6%. In another study with
repeated measurements of blood pressure in 6790 adolescents
(11–17 years) from the USA, prevalence of hypertension was
3.2%.4 Monyeki et al.5 disaggregated his data on hypertension by
gender in 1884 rural children aged 6–13 years from South Africa,
noting that 1.0–5.8% of the boys and 3.1–11.4% of the girls had
hypertension. He also noted that obesity was intercorrelated with
socioeconomic status (SES) and hypertension. Pavicevic et al.6
examined 3000 Serbian children (aged 7–16 years) during regular
school days. Prevalence of arterial hypertension for all children was
0.93% and was the lowest in children aged 7–8 years (0.83%), and
the highest in children aged 15–16 years (2.96%). Finally, in a study
of 15 612 school children (6–14 years) from Pescara province, Italy,
the prevalence of hypertension was 11.1%.7
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